exactly how many of the santri-the strictly committed Moslems-feel since they see aggressive propagation of the state ideology of Pancasila as undermining the role of religion.
The Pancasila State
The Indonesian state is based on five fundamental principles (Pancasila): belief in one god, humanitarianism, national unity, consensual democracy, and social justice. First enunciated by Sukarno in June 1945 as the value foundation of an independent state, in the New Order regime of President Suharto the Pancasila has been ideologically specified and operationalized to provide guidance for all relationships in every social domain. Rather than the universal values embodied in the original formulations (later narrowed by Sukarno himself), Pancasila today is interpreted as embodying traditional indigenous (idealized) values of social harmony and absence of political conflict, providing culturally neutral guidelines for behavior in a plural society where "development" tends to be measured by aggregate indicators of economic growth. Furthermore, by making Pancasila the official ideology of all Indonesians, Islam becomes but one of five tolerated religious streams with no legitimate claim to exclusivity.
In 1978 the government embarked on an intensive program of ideological training and upgrading through courses of study known by the contraction of the full Indonesian name as P4 courses.3 By law (II/MPR11978) all Indonesian citizens are to go through the P4 course. The first targets of Pancasila "upgrading" were bureaucrats, and the courses have now replaced the traditional "hazing" period in the universities and will be in place in the junior and senior high schools in the 1985/1986 academic year. In the lower schools Pancasila Moral Education (PMP) has become part of the standard curriculum. By cabinet decision in October 1984, it was decided to proceed with the Pancasila upgrading of ulamas, Christian priests and pastors, and Balinese religious men. Other, voluntary, social groups have followed suit. Even the prostitutes of Samarinda (East Kalimantan) have undergone P4 training "to increase their devotion and service to the community and the nation."4 For the government, the internalization of Pancasila values is the necessary mental and spiritual prerequisite for citizens to discharge their duties in the state. For critics of the regime, however, it is an effort to 3. Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila. the sources of unrest mobilizing antigovernment elements were more than just religious when he quipped that the instigators of agitation will say that "only the military and the Chinese enjoy the good life in this country."7 The uttering of such sentiments, albeit couched in more sophisticated terms, caused some publications to lose their licenses in 1984. Expo was banned in January for an article on the alleged government connections of Chinese billionaires. Topik was suspended in February for two articles tending to arouse class hatred among the poor. Fokus was banned in May for printing an article on wealth in Indonesia considered likely to create "negative social effects." However, as the editorialist of the Catholic daily Kompas pointed out after the Fokus ban, "The problem of the economically strong and the economically weak, of those who are already enjoying the fruits of development and those who are still deprived of them is still with us."8
If the New Order's formula for success is "organizational superiority + economic growth = regime survival,"9 i.e., legitimacy depends upon economic performance, then worrisome signs are on the horizon even though outwardly the macro economy looks healthy. In April Indonesia's fourth five-year development plan (REPELITA IV) was inaugurated. It began with a FY 1985 "austerity" budget. The need to accommodate to the "post-oil era" led to slashes in subsidies for consumer essentials such as rice, sugar, and domestic fuel. It was the regime's ability to make politically tough but economically rational decisions and enforce them that helped Indonesia successfully weather the impact of the global recession.
The 
Investment Strategy
A significant issue in the investment strategy of REPELITA IV is the proper mix between labor intensive and capital intensive industries as well as the appropriate technology/high technology dichotomy. The pressing social need that directly relates to regime stability continues to be job creation, and it is independently expected that the employment situation by the end of REPELITA IV will worsen as the labor force population grows. Conservatively we might expect the unemployment rate to rise from the World Bank figure of 4. 1% in 1980 to nearly 9%, or in absolute numbers, an increase from nearly 3 million to 10 million unemployed. To this we must add the nearly 30% of the population that is significantly underemployed.
The ability of the agricultural sector to absorb employment is rapidly declining. One would expect an industrialization strategy that would emphasize labor intensive, small-scale industries with a high domestic content. Although the five-year plan attaches priority to job creation and small-scale industry (critics would call it only lip service), in fact it is still programmatically skewed to large-scale capital intensive activity with high import content such as the internationally uncompetitive and already technologically obsolescent Cilegon cold rolling steel mill (another undertaking of the Liem group together with state-owned Krakateau Steel). Furthermore, the centerpiece of Indonesia's industrialization strategy is the development of a high technology complex focused on dual capable military/civilian products of which the PT Nurtanio aircraft enterprise is the most highly visible. Although backed by powerful political and bureaucratic interests, the spillover of this strategy in terms of jobs and technology transfer to small industry is arguable.'0 President Suharto has vigorously denied as groundless and misleading charges that the economic development program benefited only a minority of the population and was widening the rich-poor gap. He places the program in the longer path of development on which Indonesia has been progressing since the first REPELITA in 1969. Social equity will emerge in this sequence in the sixth REPELITA (1994-1999). The question is whether or not pent up social and economic demands, possibly linked to revolutionary Islam, can be contained until REPELITA VI without much greater coercion.
Foreign Policy "Our voice should be heard. After all, we are a nation of 160 million people!" This statement is the bottom line justification for a new national assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy. After years of carefully projecting a nonthreatening, cooperative low profile in the region and beyond, Jakarta now is beginning to claim a role more consonant with its deeply felt need for leadership. In the words of former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia David Newsom, it is a nation "which is reaffirming its position in the world and the historical view of its nationalism."" That view is based not only on the political arithmetic of population but also on national perceptions of geostrategic importance, natural resources, "golden age" myths of Majapahit, and an implicit demand for respectful recognition on the international scene of the accomplishments of Suharto's New Order regime. The desire to play a role more commensurate with Indonesia's size, power, and interests was made official in the presidential tasking of the Fourth Development Cabinet announced in March 1983. The fourth item in the five point program (Panca Krida) called for the "intensification of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy." A significant theme in the Indonesian message is that Indonesia is going to participate-struggle if necessary-in determining the regional political map. This is viewed as a natural policy demand of a major regional power, one that says it has a legitimate interest in the alterations of the regional status quo and the settlement of regional problems. Its contemporary relevance, of course, has to do with the Kampuchean crisis in which Indonesia no longer is content to simply follow the lead of ASEAN's frontline state. The more than five years of confrontation with Vietnam have in Jakarta's view made the region vulnerable to Chinese political and strategic designs, further isolated and weakened Vietnam as a potential buffer to China, and impeded the development of self-reliant, nonaligned regionalism. 
DUAL TRACK DIPLOMACY

Conclusion
Jusuf Wanandi of Jakarta's CSIS, an intellectual unit spurring the new higher international profile, has been quoted as saying, "The world's going to be hearing a lot more from Indonesia now."'2 Its voice has been quiet but increasingly firm. In viewing Indonesia's international position, three factors have been identified as contributing to its contemporary constructive regional role: internal political stability, economic growth, and foreign policy consistency.'3 The last, foreign policy consistency, which is further described as conciliatory, amicable, and flexible, is in large measure dependent on the first two, essentially domestic conditions. Although there is no empirical basis for expecting domestic breakdown and upheaval, we are not so far removed historically from the stridency of Indonesia's Old Order and its foreign policy excesses not to have some question about how high the new foreign policy profile might become if some of the political and structural problems of Indonesia remain unresolved through REPELITA IV and the expected 1988 presidential succession.
